Rudo Grace Gwata-Charamba

Correspondent

Literature shows that, globally, most anti-corruption initiatives, notably in Africa, are generally associated with failure.

The shortcoming is attributed to the tendency, by key stakeholders, to settle for “wholesale” solutions of foreign origin without appropriately adapting them to their specific conditions.

Such practice is, in turn, blamed on the lack of evidence-based models, within the field of corruption, to draw upon.

Consequently, initiatives are designed and implemented without establishing strong evidence bases relating to the forms and drivers of corruption within specific contexts.

Initiatives are often launched, with lots of trumpet blasts and pronouncements of grand ideals, usually bringing lots of both hope and cynicism at the same time.

Stakeholders expect preventive changes within systems, the punishment of perpetrators plus the introduction of disincentives.

However, the campaigns have missed results with some leading to punishments that serve as a deterrent to society while others remain at the level of rhetoric.

Basically, anti-corruption interventions are ordinarily expected, individually or collectively, to lead to behaviour change within society; a factor that makes the Results Based Management (RBM), a highly suitable strategy for the implementation of these initiatives.

Wide “design reality gaps,” signifying sizeable mismatches between the expectations built into the designs of the initiative in relation to the realities, are often the major source of failure that is often erroneously attributed to “implementation problems” and thus incorrectly addressed.

Research shows most of the gaps emanate from differential contexts within which the anti-corruption projects are implemented or they are created by unjustified ambition.

Ensuring that real objectives and values of key stakeholders closely match the design requirements is one way of addressing this shortcoming.

That is, all key stakeholders ought to genuinely want corruption to be reduced and they also should have the personal impetus and political will to make that happen.

In the long term, society needs to adopt a culture of non-tolerance towards corruption through the consistent clarification of values and standards.

Although, anti-corruption initiatives are often initiated by the vision of a dedicated individual or group of individuals, within any sector, there is a tendency to assume that they only belong to the sphere of governments.

Consequently, the implementation capacity is reduced as some citizens, within the private sector, civil society as well as society at large, “watch from the terraces” while waiting for updates on outcomes of these initiatives.

Failure to take the time and the effort to consult some stakeholder groups, as is the case with most initiatives, is a major sources of shortcomings in anti-corruption initiatives.

Such practice inhibits the necessary buy-in and support to guarantee success while maximum and meaningful stakeholder participation enables the design process to move beyond the “discourse of rationality” to a closer contextual initiative design.

This confirms the e essence participation, a basic principle of RBM.

Other sources of failure encompass unreasonably high ambition plus costly administrative mistakes, both in resources and time.

Relatedly, the design and implementation of the associated projects hampered by the fact theories about the path from beginning to end (resourcing to impact) of projects are often vague while the preconditions for success are not addressed.

These shortcomings can be addressed by ensuring that decisions are strictly informed by evaluative evidence, another key principle of RBM.

The use of sound analytical frameworks, such as RBM and its component, the Theory of Change (ToC) approach, for both its design and implementation including the assessment of progress is another driver of success.

ToC, a sound framework and key component of RBM, focuses on how and why an initiative works, and thus significantly increases the chances of success.

The theory was developed for purposes of exploring behaviours and results that are not easily measurable thus making it very well suited for anti-corruption initiatives.

Determining how far the execution of an initiative has reduced corruption, a multifaceted and often hidden phenomenon, is ordinarily difficult since such effect can be a result of the work of multiple projects by equally multiple players.

This calls for the design and execution of associated programmes that are supported by good analytical frameworks and building a sound ToC.

ToC has proved to be a worthwhile initial step in accounting for the influence that an initiative has on the overall complex goal and hence immensely improving the design of the associated initiative.

A sound ToC can be built in five phases as depicted below:

Preliminary Analysis: Involves the elementary analysis which includes a review of the general literature on “what works” in the particular area of anti-corruption plus a study of the context to identify the actors, incentives as well as and interests that may facilitate or hinder implementation.

Mapping of the Results chain: Conduct a backward mapping of RBM results chain which involves constructing or reconstructing the causal pathways of change to create a results chain. Clearly specify what the initiative seeks to do, for whom, and where thus avoiding vague statements such as, “Reduce corruption at all levels.

Instead it can be stated as, “Reduce corruption in the procurement of services at the local government level in the Y province.”

Then construct the results chain by beginning with the overall objective and then working backward, identifying different levels of results first followed by related activities and resource requirements. With such a process, stakeholders focus what must change what must be done which often turns out to be their favourite activities

Assess the Logic: Assess the rationality of the internal logic of the initiative, test it by considering relevant external influences through conducting a forward mapping and identify the associated preconditions.The phase begins with considering the available resources (inputs) and moving to activities to expected deliverables (outputs) to changes in people’s behaviour or in their conditions (outcomes) asking critical questions regarding the sufficiency of each element to cause the expected change (result).

Essentially, the process involves the “if . . . then . . . because” method of questioning to provide the reality check on the results chain.

Whenever the assumption is determined not to fully hold, then a precondition is identified.

A typical assumption is that all individuals will have an interest in fighting corruption.

This does not necessarily hold because some might be benefiting from it or believe that government systems are too difficult to change and therefore the associated efforts would be in vain.

The provision of incentives would represent a necessary precondition for buy-in to the idea.

Build the Theory of Change: Clearly identify the links as well as the associated specific preconditions including expected/ targeted behavioural change, resource requirements plus expected nature of support, among other issues.

Distinguish internal and external preconditions to guide the selection of strategies to handle of each one of them. Remove all obstacles as far as possible.

Identify a possible and reasonable path towards achieving the desired objective(s).

Review, Learn and Adjust: Review the pathway, using another round of backward-and-forward mapping and validating the preconditions identified through reference to.

Using the recommendations, design or redesign the results chain or the whole initiative, as appropriate steadfastly avoiding the “business as usual” attitude but identifying what exactly should be different.

Explicitly the design process is informed by evaluative, documented evidence and entails design-test-learn-redesign guide. That is, analysing failure, adjusting, testing a pilot and hence forming reiterative learning loops.

In essence, RBM can effectively help to improve the processes of design, implementation, and assessment of anti-corruption initiatives.

Use of the closely associated ToC can guarantee the quality design initiatives through its focus on the preconditions and assumptions that enable the intervention to work.

Furthermore, it is a useful tool for incorporating anti-corruption components into other programmes thus facilitating the synergy of preventive and enforcement approaches to corruption.

Dr Rudo Grace Gwata-Charamba is an author, development project/ programme management consultant and researcher with a special interest in Results Based Management (RBM), governance and leadership. She can be contacted via email: [email protected]

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