Dr Gift Mugano
Last week my discussion was centred on the SaemaulUndong (SU) Movement as an approach we can take lessons from to implement our national blueprint the Zimbabwe Agenda on Sustainable Socio Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset).

From the onset, let me take the opportunity to apologise for the error made in the headline of the article which was written as DPRK (referring to North Korea) instead of South Korea.

Zimbabwe is on record when it comes to churning good policies. The devil for us is in the implementation. Everyone is puzzled why we always fail at implementation. There is no straight answer to this but some of the factors inherent in Zimbabwe include lack of institutional framework, inadequate time allocated to the blueprint and absence of a monitoring and evaluation framework.

Zim-Asset suffers from the same fate. From the look of things some of the milestones outside the quick wins cannot be implemented in five years. This therefore constrains the overall achievement of the set targets.

As Dr Godfrey Kanyenze once said, it is good to be a laggard because you don’t have to invent the wheel but just copy, I found it necessary to continue with South Korea experience this week and next week so that we can take a retrospection of our policies and also borrow lessons from the mighty Korean experience. This week I will focus my discussion on the institutional framework which was put in place for the SU.

What is obtaining in South Korea is that an average of 50 households, a maul (traditional-rural village in the Republic of Korea) is not always identical with the lowest level of governmental administration, which is known as the rior dong,since in many cases a rior dong comprises more than one maul. This distinction is important because the maul rather than the rior dong was the basic strategic unit of the SU movement. During the 1970s, mauls were geographically categorised into five groups: (i) open-field villages, (ii) hillside villages, (iii) mountain villages, (iv) fishing villages,and (v) suburban villages.

The strategy of the SaemaulUndong (SU)movement was that each of these five categories of villages would implement a set of projects that corresponded to the comparative advantage of each village type. Each of these categories of villages embraced its own unique set of traditions.

As previously mentioned in last week article, the administrative style of the SU movement during the 1970s mirrored that of the authoritarian rule of President Park ChungHee. Thus during this period, the SU movement was administered in a hierarchical manner by means of an administrative pyramid that comprised ministries of the central government as well as all levels of government administration including that of the province,the city – county, the town and the village.

In tandem with this hierarchical administrative structure,the Government organised Government – civilian committees for mobilising villagers and workers at each level of government administration. Financing for SU projects in rural communities was thus provided by the Government-controlled National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and National Fishery Co-operative Federation, as well as public financial institutions.

Government Operation

At the central Government level, the Ministry of Home Affairs controlled the SU movement’s local administrative agencies. In 1971, a Saemaul director position was established under the director-general of the local administrative bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This allowed creation of Saemaul divisions at each level of local SU movement administrative agencies. The newly created Office of the Saemaul Director, under the director-general of the local administrative bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, had overall responsibility for the SU movement.

At all levels of local SU administrative bodies,Saemaul comprehensive briefing rooms were set up under the offices of all deputy governors and mayors.

In 1973, SU-related divisions were created in a number of central Government ministries. These included the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Energy and Resources. These new SU-related divisions included the following: (i) the Division of Saemaul Income under the Bureau of Agricultural Development at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,(ii) the Division of Processed Food under the Bureau of Small- and Medium-Scale Industries as well as the Division of Telephone Services for Farming and Fishing Communities under the Bureau of Power Development at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,(iii) the Saemaul Education Office under the Chief School Commissioner’s Office at the Ministry of Culture and Education, and the Division of Regional Welfare under the Bureau of Social Affairs at the Ministry of Public Health and Society.

The Government officials assigned to the new Saemaul-related divisions and sections were recruited from an elite corps of civil servants within the ministries concerned and were favoured with respect to promotions for their service in their Saemaul-related posts. As a result, local administrative agencies followed these same principles in staffing their SU-related positions. Further, these Saemaul-related positions were given a great deal of flexibility with respect to their budgetary allocations.

These arrangements enabled smooth coordination not only between ministries, but also between government agencies and public organizations such as the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the National Fishery Cooperative Federation.

Given that implementation of SU projects was ultimately the responsibility of residents of rural communities, Government intervention was to be limited to administrative guidance, financial support, technological assistance, and monitoring. That said, there was ultimately a significant amount of interaction between local administrative officers and community leaders at the village level.

Government – Civilian

Co-ordination

In 1972, the Saemaul promotional councils were organised for the purpose of facilitating coordination between the government and civil society. These councils operated at the central, provincial,county, town, and village levels. Given the relatively rapid increase in the number and scale of SU projects during the 1970s, the Saemaul promotional councils played an increasingly important role in coordinating SU project planning and implementation as they related both to the various levels of Government and the communities that ultimately implemented these projects.

The ri/dong development committee (village committee), which was the lowest level of village administration of the SU movement, implemented the SU projects under the leadership of the village chief, the latter being nominated by both the Government and the Saemaul leaders who were directly elected by villagers. The up/myon implementation committee (town committee) addressed SU project implementation bottlenecks as noted by community members in consultation with Saemaul leaders and local administrative officials.

The county committee provided guidance to, and coordinated,the SU movement at the regional community level under guidance of the mayor and local administrative officials. The provincial committee created a comprehensive plan for the SU movement in the province concerned under the guidance of the governor, the provincial administration, and educational leaders, which included the deputy governor,superintendent, university professors, agricultural or fishery cooperative provincial managers, and local broadcasting company managers.

The Saemaul Central Promotional Council,which was the highest-level committee of the SU movement, coordinated planning and implementation of the SU movement overall. The council therefore comprised the minister of home affairs; other cabinet-level ministers including the deputy prime minister of the Economic Planning Board, as well as the ministers of finance, national defence, education,agriculture and fisheries, commerce and industry,construction, health and social affairs, transportation,communication, culture and information; and Saemaul leaders drawn from the non-government sector.

Saemaul promotional council

at the town(up, myon) level

The Saemaul promotional council at the town level (SPCT) was the base organisation for coordination between the government and the community coordination. Chaired by the town mayor, the council also comprised the deputy town mayor, the police chief, elementary and secondary school principals, the town-level rural community promoter, the town-level officers of the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives, the town postmaster, and Saemaul leaders. These were the community’s opinion makers and representatives of the community’s interests.

In short, the members of this council represented the agencies in the local community that guided, supported, and sustained the SU movement at the town level.

The SPCT evaluated the villagers’ needs and the resources the village had at its disposal in planning the budget, materials, and labor required for implementing SU projects at the local community level and for allocating SU projects among village implementation units. Saemaul education was an important qualification for serving on the SPCT in that it helped ensure proper participation by all members of the local community.

Saemaul promotional council

at the county level

The Saemaul promotional council at the county level (SPCC), which represented the next higher level of SU administration after the SPCT, was chaired by the county mayor and likewise comprised the county superintendent, the chief of the police station, the county rural community promoter,the county officers of the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives, the agricultural high school principal, and the county postmaster.

Half of the county council members were drawn from the agriculture sector since a major objective of the SU movement was that of increasing rural household income. Nevertheless, local administrative leaders such as the county mayor, the chief of the police station, and the county superintendent were key members of the council, as they linked with the Saemaul promotional councils at the central and provincial levels of government.

The SPCC evaluated the county’s development potential against its resource endowment and decided which SU projects were the most appropriate for the county to undertake. The SPCC guided and coordinated the SU movement at the village level through the county-level administrative agencies with respect to financing, material, and technological resources.

It likewise encouraged participation in theSU movement by the rural population, particularly with regard to projects that built or upgraded basic infrastructure. Similarly, the SPCC presented Saemaul education programmes and introduced modern agricultural technology to community members through Saemaul leaders. Finally, the SPCC estimated the likely future achievements of SU projects and analysed the factors likely to either propel or constrain the success of SU initiatives.

Lessons we can draw from the SU are diverse. From this article, quick lessons which can be drawn are:

The policy framework was developed after taking into account situational analysis of the villages involved. This enabled the Korean Government to tailor make policy measures which are relevant to the needs of each constituency;

There was effective central planning from the highest office on land (President Office) to the village level. We have partially done the same on Zim-Asset. The Zim-Asset is coordinated from the President Office but there is no clear structure on how it will cascade to the provinces, districts and village levels for implementation. The cluster working groups within Zim-Asset reflect a national structure!

Government officers who were elected into the SU movement were empowered to make decisions which took away bureaucracy and red tape thereby aiding quick implementation;

The Korean drafted a robust monitoring and implementation tool which in some cases enabled them to foresee obstacles in advance and prepare solutions well on time as opposed in our many instances where we found ourselves cornered by El nino with no escape root like irrigation;

The programme was very inclusive (included professors from universities, communities, private sector, development partners, media and Government) not for the sake of inclusion within the policy documents but in the actual implementation;

There was robust communication strategy which enabled various communities to share experiences;

Competition was rife and rewards were given to successful communities; and

Programmes were given adequate time not our tradition five year thump suck time period.

As we review the Zim-Asset we need to consider some of these lessons. It is clear that most of the milestones within the Zim-Asset required more time to be achieved even if resources are available. It is therefore imperative to consider these lessons from the SU as we plan for Zim-Asset 2!

Dr Mugano is an Economic Advisor, Trade and Competitiveness Expert, Research Associate at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (SA) and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe’s Graduate School of Management. Feedback: Email: [email protected], cell: +263 772 541 209.

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