How Rhodesia met grief north, south. . . Zim, Zambia divergent paths to freedom The late Dr Joshua Nkomo
The late Dr Joshua Nkomo

The late Dr Joshua Nkomo

The next year showed Nkomo that constitutional negotiation, as had occurred in Zambia, would not be possible in the Rhodesian state and thus armed conflict was going to be the only alternative to remaining under colonial control. However, as the struggle intensified, the cooperation between Zanu and Zapu became increasingly fractured and contentious, most likely spurred on by the Rhodesian intelligence services.

“IN great contrast to the Zambian movement, the guerilla war in Rhodesia was ‘geared to achieving nationalist goals through the barrel of a gun’” Alex Laverty

The Northern Rhodesia “fight” for independence culminated in the formation of the Republic of Zambia on October 24 1964.

There is a significant difference how the two Rhodesias attained independence.

Through a complicated election scheme devised by the British and Northern Rhodesian governments, power was successfully and peacefully transferred to the majority of Zambians.

The eventual prime minister, Kenneth Kaunda, persuaded the white electorate in the run-up to the election that bringing black rule to the country would not result in the collapse of the nation as had occurred in other places on the continent.

After the election was held, Kaunda successfully put together a coalition government with the other African party, Nkumbula’s party that held a significant number of seats.

In the end, after another election of the African majority with greater non-African support, it was a straightforward change towards universal suffrage and single-member constituencies that brought about majority rule in Zambia, an important difference when compared to the end results in Zimbabwe.

Joshua Nkomo led the early substantial nationalist movement, the National Democratic Party (NDP), in Zimbabwe beginning in 1957. This resistance movement was united and primarily run from its headquarters in Salisbury. However, in 1963 disagreements over ideology, tactics, and leadership personality led to a split within the movement.

This created two different liberation camps, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) under the initial guidance of Ndabaningi Sithole while Nkomo led the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu), formed out of the defunct NDP. Zapu had originally pinned its hopes for majority rule on British intervention like had occurred in Zambia and Malawi.

However, the Rhodesians were much more entrenched in the political structures and armed forces than any British colony in Africa.

The next year showed Nkomo that constitutional negotiation, as had occurred in Zambia, would not be possible in the Rhodesian state and thus armed conflict was going to be the only alternative to remaining under colonial control.

However, as the struggle intensified, the cooperation between Zanu and Zapu became increasingly fractured and contentious, most likely spurred on by the Rhodesian intelligence services.

The fact that these two groups had split over ethnic lines did not help in terms of coordination and cooperation. Zapu was generally Ndebele and Zanu primarily made up of the Shona.

This ethnic division in itself caused a major setback against the settlers, as the movement lost those Africans that wished to only participate in a passive fashion.

Thus the movement, being drawn along ethnic lines, required a full commitment.

These two organisations also drew in support from different international bodies.

The Soviet bloc supported Zapu, while China supported Zanu.

The OAU was unsure over which side to back and in the end backed both of the moments but their contributions were not as significant because of the financial capability they lacked when compared to the socialist states.

At this time in the late 1950s Black Nationalism “never presented a military threat to the federal establishment” that had united Nyasaland, and the two Rhodesias.

However, the political impact was immense. In Zambia the opposition was strong, and by 1963 the federation had collapsed and Malawi and the Republic of Zambia emerged.

The white government in Rhodesia also expected to gain independence from the United Kingdom at this time. However, the colony continued under a self-rule policy from Britain that followed the 1961 constitution that was theoretically colour-blind.

Property and educational qualifications were put in place to vote for the ‘A’ role of 50 parliamentarians, while most of the African population voted for the ‘B’ role of 15 seats. The qualifications allowed for an increasing number of blacks to vote for the ‘A’ role positions, though only very slowly.

While Rhodesia could effectively govern how it saw fit, there was a fear that the new Labour Government in the United Kingdom would force a change in the constitution to allow more African say in the election of parliament. Thus in 1965 the new Prime Minister, Ian Smith, issued his Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Britain at first did nothing, thinking that Rhodesia would eventually come back to the crown or float towards disaster.

Resistance towards the government continued to grow after the UDI as a greater number of Africans became educated but still faced unemployment. Social constraints still faced the majority of the black population even when they had reached a financial level on par with some of the whites.

Additionally, white farmers were reluctant to give up any of the land on their farms. Thus this unemployed constituency turned to the liberation movement.

Though for a time after the UDI the Rhodesian police was more than capable of dealing with the unrest that had begun under Federation in the late 1950s.

This slow start to a liberation movement when compared to that in Zambia is because of the harsh reactionary steps taken by the Rhodesian government, but also because the NDP made a mistake in assuming that the tactics that proved successful in Zambia would also be successful in Rhodesia. The change over in Zambia had much to do with British intervention and pressure on the white colonial government.

In reality Britain had little control over Rhodesia, and the 1961 constitution that was negotiated between Britain, Rhodesia, and black leaders fell far short of the NDP’s desires and they renounced it.

Faced with a growing insurgency, the settlers also did away with the 1961 constitution, bringing the Rhodesian Front into political power.

Armed struggle seemed to pose a stumbling bloc for the dual movements because of a lack of boisterous support from the local population. Before the parties were banned by the state, crowds swelled at the rallies held in major population centres. However, the population’s eagerness to support a guerilla campaign were quite tempered in comparison, perhaps because of Prime Minister Ian Smith’s campaign to bribe, harass, and intimidate the population into not offering their support. Smith’s success caused the movements and their backers to question their own methods in confronting the state.

Calls for unity eventually came from all outside forces, and reluctantly Zanu and Zapu came to an understanding that would allow them to concentrate their resources on the Rhodesian government rather than each other.

In great contrast to the Zambian movement, the guerilla war in Rhodesia was “geared to achieving nationalist goals through the barrel of a gun”. The major strategy of the war was to target the transport system of Rhodesia. As African neighbours were slowly closing off Rhodesia, most of their links became southward looking.

These lifelines to South Africa became a primary target for the guerillas.

This included disrupting the land communication links around the country through roadside ambushes and mining the roads. This tactic was especially employed in those areas deemed operational zones.

Finally, the last goal of the war was to disrupt the agriculture, the country’s primary foreign income earner. This also would achieve the aim of scaring white farmers off their farms. This was seen to be a crucial step in breaking the moral of the whites.

Reading from the Mao tse Tung play book on peasant revolutions, Zanla concentrated a great deal of energy on winning over the masses in the rural areas. Attacks were planned and carried out on African collaborators, and just like the government. Mao teachings also influenced battle tactics of the Zimbabwean liberation movement. The strategy of fighting first in the countryside in order to surround the cities is a classic Maoist tactic.

As the war intensified and more encounters with the Rhodesian security forces resulted in the deaths of white soldiers there was an escalating struggle within the nationalist movement. This was due to the transition from a political body to a military one. Nkomo, having failed in his talks with Smith in the 1970s, was thought to be on the immediate decline but those predictions turned out to be false.

This eventually led to Nkomo declaring that black Rhodesians would have to decide between Zapu and Zanu.

He claimed that his African National Congress, Zapu, was the only legitimate liberation movement as it had been recognised by the OAU.

The uneasy alliance that had been briefly fostered between Zanu, now led by Robert Mugabe, and Nkomo was finally over.

While the Second Chimurenga war was under way, by 1976 the nationalist liberation movement was firmly divided both militarily and politically.

On the side of the Smith government, the toil of war was beginning to take its toll on the nation. Tourism in 1976 was at an all time low. Income from tourism was important since the UDI, and this loss contributed to the worsening economic situation as more and more young white men were forced into the military and combating the ‘terrorists’.

On the military front, other than the Special Air Service of the Rhodesian special forces, the military was responding on basically a reactionary strategy thus eliminating their superior firepower and air superiority from the equation.

Rather the military had to engage in pre-emptive strikes across international borders attempting to hit the camps that guerillas had established in the independent Zambia and Frelimo controlled Mozambique.

However, these strikes had little impact on the war as a whole, but as the guerilla forces in the country increased, these strikes became essential to the war effort.

As the end of the 1970s approached it was obvious that neither side had an upper hand in the conflict. Attacking across borders was causing massive casualties to the guerrillas and costing the aide-giving countries hundreds of millions of dollars per year because of the border embargo placed on Rhodesia.

Lewis Gann terms these so-called front line states as “front-line trenches in Salisbury’s all-out war on their territory”.

On the guerilla side, Nkomo’s Zapu had a well-stocked armoury while Zanu continued to bicker among itself for leadership control.

When the Conservative Party came to power in 1979 in the United Kingdom, it offered both sides a way to end the war.

The Rhodesians realised that no other British government would give them a more favourable deal than the Tories.

The guerillas on the other hand were increasingly losing manpower while internal discord and morale problems plagued their backlines.

Negotiations took place at the Lancaster House in London in 1979, and after tense and shaky talks, a deal was brokered to allow Rhodesia to temporarily return to the control of the crown while new elections were being arranged.

It was after these talks that Mugabe shifted his tough nationalist talk to an election campaign of reconciliation and peace.

Mugabe’s strategy worked brilliantly as he and his Zanu party were understood to be the only party capable of fulfilling their election promises.

Thus support from both the middle and lower classes poured in for Mugabe.

The new Zimbabwean government, in contrast to the Zambian, brought in leaders from all of the primary parties.

Nkomo received a position in the cabinet as well as two white Members of Parliament.

The glaring difference in the liberation movements of Zambia and Zimbabwe is the loss of life incurred on the settlers and the African nationalists.

From the onset of Zambian nationalism, a policy of non-violence was implemented.

While not always followed precisely, the level of violence never reached even a tenth of what would occur in Rhodesia.

Thus UNIP and Kaunda relied on protest and the eventual intervention of the British Colonial Office when it came to achieving their aims of majority rule.

Zanu and Zapu did not have that luxury when confronting the settler state in Rhodesia.

Only after a long and bloody struggle did the Smith government give in to international and internal pressure to negotiate their Rhodesian Front party out of power. Thus Mugabe and his government had a major issue of reconciling the scars of a beleaguered nation, while in Zambia the African government got straight to governing.

The measures taken by Mugabe to integrate the different parties into his government seemed to be an unprecedented and highly enlightened move to make sure that his country would enter the international scene as a beacon of hope for the changeover to majority rule across the continent of Africa.

Abridged from theafricanfile.com

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